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Abstract
Restricted views of process behaviour result in a form of abstrac 
tion which is useful in the construction of specications involving fault 
tolerance and atomicity This paper presents an operational characteri 
sation of abstraction for refusable and non refusable events in terms of
testing This view is related to standard notions of testing and to the
denotational characterisations and it is encapsulated within the CSP de 
notational semantics It informs reinforces and extends the traditional
denotational approach to abstraction
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  Introduction
Abstraction arises in a system when some of its activity is not directly observ
able In such cases the nature of the internal activity may only be indirectly
inferred from the visible behaviour of the process A form of abstraction thus
arises when an observer only has a restricted view of the system This situation
may arise for example in the context of faulttolerant systems if an observer
interacts with the system on particular activities but is unconcerned with the
faulttolerance mechanisms which may be considered as abstracted It also
arises in the context of security where a lowlevel user should be prevented
from achieving any interaction with the more secret parts of the system
Process algebraic approaches to abstraction generally provide some operators
to provide abstraction In the context of CSP which is the concern of this
paper the hiding operator often called the abstraction operator provides
a mechanism for removing particular events from the process interface and
making them internal Events internalised in this way become urgent non
refusable However Roscoe Ros has observed that events in a process
interface generally fall the two categories of refusable and nonrefusable and
that both kinds of event can be abstracted This has led to a more sophisticated
understanding of abstraction expressed within the CSP language and in terms
of its denotational semantics
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative understanding of abstrac
tion by taking an operational view in terms of testing This will provide a more
direct de
nition of abstraction independently of any particular process algebra
and will thereby provide a more explicit and intuitive characterisation This
may inform and throw new light on the denotational approach
 Notation
CSP is an abstract language designed to describe the communication patterns of
processes in terms of events that they may engage in For a fuller introduction
to the language and the semantic models the reader is referred to Ros
In CSP systems are modelled in terms of the events that they can perform
The set of all possible events 
xed at the beginning of the analysis is denoted
 Events may be atomic in structure or may consist of a number of distinct
components or 
elds Examples of events used in this paper are l
n
and h
r

which are atomic events and in   which is a compound event modelling the
occurrence of the message   along channel in
Processes are the entities that are described by CSP expressions and they
are described in terms of the possible events that they may engage in The
process RUN
A
is repeatedly willing to engage in any event from the set A
The process CHAOS
A
is able to repeatedly engage in events from A but might
at any time nondeterministically refuse to perform any The process STOP is
unable to perform any events
The pre
xed process a   P is able initially to perform only a and subse

quently to behave as P  The pre
x choice process x  A  Px  oers a choice
of all the events in the set A   and its subsequent behaviour Px  is deter
mined by the event chosen The output cv   P is able initially to perform
only c v  the output of v on channel c after which it behaves as P  The input
cx  T   Px  can accept any input x of type T along channel c following
which it behaves as Px  If the type T of the channel is clear from the context
then it may be elided from the input which becomes cx   Px 
Its 
rst event will be any event of the form c t where t  T  The process P  
Q pronounced P external choice Q  is initially willing to behave either as P
or as Q  with the choice resolved by the process environment on performance
of the 
rst event The process P u Q pronounced P internal choice Q  can
behave either as P or as Q  and the environment of the process has no control
over which The process P n A behaves as P  but with all of the events in A
performed internally where they were previously external events
Processes may also be composed in parallel If D is a set of events then the
process P jD jQ behaves as P andQ acting concurrently with the requirement
that they have to synchronise on any event in the synchronisation set D  events
not in D may be performed by either process independently of the other Inter
leaving is a special form of parallel operator in which the two components do
not interact on any events it is written P jjj Q  and is equivalent to P j fg jQ 
There is also an indexed form
jjj
i I
P
i

Processes may also be recursively de
ned by means of equational de
nitions
The operational semantics of CSP processes de
nes for any particular pro
cess which events the process can perform next and the possible processes
that can be subsequently  For example the process a   P can perform an a
event and reach the process P  This is written a   P
a
  P  The process
a   P n fag can perform an internal event denoted   and reach the process
P n fag This is written a   P n fag
 
  P n fag For the full operational
semantics of CSP see Sch	
The traces of a process P  tracesP is de
ned to be the set of 
nite se
quences of events from  that P may possibly perform Examples of traces
include the empty trace hi and hin   out    in i which is a possible trace of
the recursive process COPY  inx  T   out x   COPY  The set of in
nite
traces in nitesP are the in
nite sequences of events from  that P might
possibly perform
The failures of a process P  failuresP is de
ned to be the set of tracerefusal
pairs tr X  that P can exhibit where tr is a trace and X is a set of events that
P can refuse to participate in after some execution of the sequence of events
tr  Examples of failures include the empty failure hi  and the tracerefusal
pair hin   out    in i fout    out  g which is a possible failure of COPY  The
divergences of a process P  divergencesP are those sequences of events during
whose occurrence P might perform an in
nite sequence of internal events The
FDI semantics of a process P consists of the three sets of failures divergences
and in
nite traces of P  FDI P  hfailuresP divergencesP in nitesPi
All the denotational models for CSP are covered in detail in Ros
 
The after operator which gives the behaviour of a process P after a trace tr
is written as P  tr  It is a partial operator since tr might not be a trace of P
giving those failures divergences and in
nite traces of P which are subsequent
to the performance of the events in tr 
A process P is deterministic if it is unable to refuse events that it can do
tr X   failuresP  tr
a
hai   failuresP  tr X  fag  failuresP
If P is deterministic then it must be deterministic at all times P  tr is also
deterministic for any trace tr of P 
 Testing
Abstraction will be characterised in terms of the interfaces through which pro
cesses and tests can interact and in terms of distinguishing refusable from
nonrefusable events
We are interested in testing processes P by means of test processes T  which
can interact with P only through an interface L where L stands for lowlevel
events The set H will denote all the events that are not in the set L These
are the events that P might engage in but which the test T has no access to
Thus the set of all events   L H  where L  H   
The set L is itself divided up into refusable events LR and nonrefusable
events LN  where refusable is from the point of view of the environment of the
process P under test ie whether the environment is in a position to refuse
them For example output events of P are generally nonrefusable whereas
input events are generally refusable eg the environment can refuse to press
a key on the keyboard but it cannot refuse to allow an event to appear on
the screen An related view is to consider the set LN as those events whose
occurrence is entirely under the control of the process P  whereas LR consists
of those events which require cooperation from the environment
H is also divided up into the disjoint sets HR and HN 
Four subsets of  are thus identi
ed HN  HR LN and LR These sets are
pairwise disjoint and their union is 
This partition of  will be characterised by a function p which indicates for
each event which set it is in
p    fhn hr  ln lrg
The relationship between p and the sets of the partition is that
HN
p
 fa j pa  hng
HR
p
 fa j pa  hrg
LN
p
 fa j pa  lng
LR
p
 fa j pa  lrg
The sets H  L HN  HR LN and LR are dependent on the partition function
p and so will generally be subscripted with the p In this paper we follow the

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P
Figure  Partitioning P s interface
convention that l
n
 LN
p
 l
r
 LR
p
 h
n
 HN
p
 h
r
 HR
p
 This partition of an
interface is illustrated in Figure 
The testing relations will be de
ned with respect to a partition function p
We now de
ne the notion of a LN
p
test
Definition   a LN
p
test T is a CSP process with alphabet L
p
 fg which
can never refuse any of the events in LN
p
 
  
This means that at any stage T should either have an internal transition indi
cating that it is not stable at that point or else it should have a transition for
every event in LN
p
 The alphabet of a LN
p
test contains the event  a special
success event not appearing in either H
p
or L
p
 The set of all LN
p
tests is
denoted TEST
LN
p

An execution of a process P is a 
nite or in
nite sequence of transitions e
as follows
e  P

 
  P
 


  P

     
where each step P
i

i 
  P
i 
is a step given by the operational semantics of
CSP The 
rst process expression is P  The states appearing in this execution
statese are P
 
 P

 etc
For example
a   STOP u b   STOP
 
  b   STOP
b
  STOP
is a 
nite execution If P  a   P is a recursively de
ned process then
P
 
  a   P
a
  P
 
  a   P
a
       
 
After a success state  see later has been reached we will sometimes elide the requirement
to be unable to refuse LN
p
in tests given in some examples This makes no dierence in this
paper since the part of an execution after success is irrelevant for our purposes

HN
p
HR
p
LN
p
LR
p
P
T

Figure  Testing P
is an in
nite execution
To test a process P with a test T and interface L
p
 executions e of the
process P jL
p
jT  n L
p
are considered This arrangement is illustrated in
Figure 
An execution e is successful if and only if there is some process expression
P
i
 statese from which an  event is possible
Definition  
e is successful 	 
P  statese  P

 
 
Dierent notions of testing are captured by dierent modalities of successful
testing may testing is concerned with the possibility of successful execution
and must testing is concerned with the guarantee of successful execution
It is a wellknown result Hen		 that standard may and must testing cor
respond directly to the denotational semantics two processes are may testing
equivalent precisely when they have the same trace semantics and two processes
are must testing equivalent if and only if they have the same FDI semantics
  May testing
The notion of may
p
testing can now be de
ned For generality and consistency
of approach with must
p
testing introduced later it is parametrised by the
partition function p However observe that it is independent of the way H
p
and
L
p
are themselves partitioned into refusable and nonrefusable events Thus the
refusability or otherwise of highlevel events is irrelevant to may testing
Definition    If P is a process and T is a LN
p
test then P may
p
T if and
only if there is some successful execution e of P jL
p
jT  n L
p
 
Observe that there will be some successful execution of P jL
p
jT  n L
p
if and
only if there is some successful execution of P jL
p
jT  The events in L
p
are
hidden to make the de
nition similar to the de
nition for must
p
testing which
will come later

A test T has access only to the events L
p
that P can perform and not the
highlevel events H
p
 In other words T can interact with P only on the events in
L
p
 so the behaviour of T in the test will be independent of the events in H
p
that
P performs Furthermore the nonrefusable events LN
p
that P might perform
cannot be blocked by T at least not before an  success event though the
subsequent behaviour of T might depend on which such events were performed
The test thus allows its result to depend on the observation of events from LN
p
even though T has no control over their occurrence
Example   Let LN
p
 fa
l
 b
l
g De
ne
P
 
 a
l
  STOP
P

 b
l
  STOP
Any LN
p
test cannot block a
l
or b
l
 However their possible success can depend
on which of these is performed The LN
p
test
T  a
l
     RUN
LN
p
  RUN
LN
p

  b
l
  RUN
LN
p
only allows the success event after a single a
l
 Thus it may succeed with P
 

but cannot with P

 P
 
may
p
T but P

may
p
T 
Note that this test with the requirement to be live on a
l
and b
l
elided after
success would become
a
l
     STOP   b
l
  RUN
LN
p

 
Two processes will be de
ned to be may
p
testing equivalent if they may
pass exactly the same LN
p
tests
Definition   P 
may
p
Q if and only if T  TEST
LN
p
 P may
p
T 	
Q may
p
T   
This means that if only events in L can be observed then P and Q should
be considered equivalent if any test which has access only to the events in L a
particular view of the process and does not block the events in LN
p
 cannot
tell the dierence between P and Q 
The following relationship between this form of may
p
testing and the
standard de NicolaHennessy form of may testing dNH	 makes it clear that
this is a generalisation in that may testing is simply may
p

testing for a
particular partition p


If p

is the partition that considers all events as lowlevel refusable events
then all events will be visible to the testing process which has no constraints on
being required to accept any of them In this case LR
p

  and H
p

and LN
p

are all   It then turns out that may
p

testing is equivalent to the standard
notion of may testing In this case the testing process has access to all the

events that the processes under test can perform and is able to block any of
them which is exactly the situation in may testing This is the most powerful
kind of test within this framework the one which allows the most distinctions
to be made
In fact given any set of nonrefusable events LN
p
 any arbitrary CSP test
T can be converted to a LN
p
test T

such that P may T 	 P may T

for any
process P  This is achieved by introducing the extra possibility         RUN
LN
p
to every state No new successful executions are introduced since whenever
any of these choices are taken then there is no possibility of reaching  so any
successful execution of P jL jT

must correspond to a successful execution of
P k T 
Example   If T is the test
a
l
  b
l
     STOP
then for LN
p
 fa
l
 b
l
g the corresponding test T

which is never able to refuse
either a
l
of b
l
will be given as
T

 RUN
LN
p
  a
l
  RUN
LN
p
  b
l
  RUN
LN
p
     RUN
LN
p
This is illustrated in Figure    
This means that if two processes are equivalent under may testing for a
particular set L then the precise nature of LN
p
and LR
p
are not relevantthey
will remain equivalent whatever the sets LN
p
and LR
p
happen to be subject
to their union remaining L
Hence may testing need only be parametrised by the set L since the 
ner
distinctions made by LN
p
and LR
p
make no dierence at the level of may
testing
A straightforward consequence of the de
nitions is as follows
Lemma   If P 
may
p
Q and L
p
 
 L
p
then P 
may
p
 
Q  
Proof If T is a test with respect to p

 so the alphabet of T is L

p
fg then
observe that P jL
p
 
jT has a successful execution if and only if P jL
p
j T jjj
RUN
L
p
nL
p
 
 has a successful execution Hence if all tests with respect to p
identify P and Q  then all tests of the form T jjj RUN
L
p
nL
p
 
 do so so P and
Q are identi
ed under may
p
 
testing equivalence  
This lemma states that if some lowlevel events are promoted to become high
level events then any processes that were previously equivalent will remain so
testing processes have access to even less information If two processes cannot
be distinguished by any tests which have access to L
p
 then they will never be
distinguished by any tests which have access to a smaller set of events L
p
 
 L
p

in fact this smaller set of tests is subsumed within the previous set of tests
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Figure   Converting Example  s test
Re	nement
The operational characterisation of may testing equivalence generalises in the
usual way to may
p
testing re
nement Essentially Q will be a re
nement of
P if any test T that Q may succeed can also allow P to succeed
Definition  
P v
may
p
Q 	 T  TEST
LN
p
 Q may
p
T  P may
p
T
 
The traditional view of re
nement considers Q as an implementation of P 
where P encapsulates or describes the permissible behaviour From the point of
view of may testing this means that if Q is able to interact with its environment
in some way then this should also be allowed by the speci
cation P  in other
words P should also be able to interact with the same environment to achieve
the same result The process Q should never be able to achieve anything not
permitted by P 
For example
l  STOP   l  STOP v
may
p
l  STOP
Any test which the right hand process may pass may also be passed by the left
hand process

  Must testing
Must testing can be considered as the dual of may testing In may testing a
process may pass a test if there is some successful execution In must testing a
process must pass a test if every execution is successful Since partial executions
might not reach a success state because the execution has not run for long
enough attention is focused onto complete executions


An execution e of a process P will be considered to be complete if P could
be unable to extend it This will certainly be the case if e is in
nite but it will
also arise if e 
nishes in a stable state where only refusable events are possible
since the process might be prevented from continuing its execution However if
there are any nonrefusable events available then the execution is not complete
since it is entirely within the process control to continue the execution
Definition  	 An execution e is complete with respect to a set of non
refusable events N if
 e is in
nite or
 e is 
nite and the last state Q of e can perform neither internal transitions
nor transitions from N 
 
The point is to consider the execution as complete even if refusable events are
possible Such executions could be complete executions if the process is placed
in a highlevel environment which the test cannot know about in which such
events are blocked
Must testing can now be de
ned
Definition  
 If P is a process and T is an LN
p
test then P must
p
T if and
only if every complete execution with respect to LN
p
HN
p
 of P jL
p
jT  n
L
p
is successful  
Example   Let P
 
be the process
P
 
 h
r
  h
n
  l
r
  l
n
  P
 
  l
r
  l
n
  P
 
De
ne the test T
 
 l
n
  RUN
l
n
  l
r
  l
n
     STOP  This will
succeed as long as the process under test  cannot perform l
n
before l
r
 and
 is guaranteed to be able to accept l
r
and then provide l
n

Then P
 
must T  If its choice is in favour of l
r
 then the complete execution
is successful If its choice is in favour of the highlevel event then the complete
execution must include the second highlevel event since this is not refusable
and so progress to the lowlevel events and hence to the success state

In the standard approach to testing these executions are the maximal ones since they
cannot be extended at all In our setting they are not necessarily maximal since nite complete
executions might be extendable with refusable events

On the other hand for the test T

 l
n
     STOP  we have that
P
 
must T

 The test does not provide l
r
 and so no lowlevel interaction
between the process and the test is possible the success state will not be reached
 
Two processes will be must
p
testing equivalent if they must pass exactly
the same tests
Definition   P 
must
p
Q if and only if T  TEST
LN
p
 P must
p
T 	
Q must
p
T   
Example    If
P

 h
r
  h
n
  l
r
  l
n
  P

  l
r
  l
n
  P

and
P

 h
r
  h
n
  l
r
  l
n
  P

u h
n
  l
r
  l
n
  P

  l
r
  l
n
  P

then P
 
 P

 and P

are all must
p
equivalent A process which interacts with
them only on l
r
and l
n
will be unable to distinguish between them  
This means that two processes P and Q should be considered equivalent
from the point of view of the interface information S  if any test which has
access only to the events in L a particular view of the process and does not
block the events in LN
p
 cannot tell the dierence between P and Q 
If p

is such that LR
p

  and H
p

and LN
p

are all   then must
p

testing is equivalent to the standard notion of must testing In this case the
testing process has access to all the events that the processes under test can
perform and is able to block any of them This is the most powerful kind of
test within this framework it allows the most distinctions to be made
In other words must testing is equivalent to must
p

testing
From the point of view of must testing it makes a dierence whether the
highlevel events are refusable or not since we are concerned with liveness and
progress For example h   l   STOP is must
p
equivalent to l   STOP
if h is not refusable but the two processes are distinguishable if h is refusable
In that case the 
rst process might be blocked from performing the event h
and never reach the stage where it oers the event l  This cannot happen
for the second process One test which distinguishes these two processes is
T  l      RUN
l


hn
hr
lr
ln
Figure  The partial order   on the interface partition
   Changing views
The notion of abstraction is bound up in the available views of a process as
given by the sets L and H  and also by the distinction between refusable and
nonrefusable events within those sets Varying the views on processes gives
dierent degrees of abstraction and varies the capability of an observer to tell
processes apart
Views on a process might be varied by shifting the boundary between re
fusable and nonrefusable events at high and lowlevels and by shifting the
boundary between levels for refusable and for nonrefusable events
As the boundaries are shifted and the partition function p changes the
equivalence relation 
must
p
changes accordingly The four possible locations of
an event of P s interface may be ordered as in Figure  where higher positions
for events result in weaker equivalence relations those more abstract relations
which identify more processes Thus as previously observed if all events are
in LR
p
then the equivalence is strongest and in fact is equivalent to standard
must testing and if all events are in HN
p
or in fact a combination of HN
p
and HR
p
 then the equivalence is weakest able only to identify the possibility
of divergence in a process
Each order relation in Figure  is associated with a lemma which supports
the claim that transferring events from the lower to the higher set preserves

must
p
 Each edge in general corresponds to a strict weakening of 
must
p
 new
equivalences are introduced in each case The resulting Corollary  	 collects
these results together if p is pointwise weaker than p

 then must
p
equivalence
implies must
p
 
equivalence
The 
rst lemma states that increasing HN at the expense of HR preserves
must testing equivalence
Lemma   If LN
p
 
 LN
p
 LR
p
 
 LR
p
 and HN
p
 
 HN
p
 then 
must
p
 
is
weaker than 
must
p
  
Proof If P 
must
p
Q then no test can distinguish them In the context
of p

there are fewer complete test executions since fewer satisfy clause  of

HN
p
HR
p
P
LR
p
LN
p
Figure  Lowlevel refusable events become nonrefusable
De
nition   for complete executions but the set of possible tests remain as
before so no test will be able to distinguish P from Q within p

  
New equivalences are introduced in general for example if h  HR then
h   l   STOP and l   STOP are distinguished but if h  HN  then they
become equal
However if HR  HN   then no new equivalences are introduced since

must
p
will be the weakest it can be only able to distinguish nondivergent
processes from possiblydivergent ones
The next lemma states that increasing LN at the expense of LR preserves
must testing equivalence This scenario is illustrated in Figure 
Lemma   If HN
p
 HN
p
 
 HR
p
 HR
p
 
 and LN
p
 
 LN
p
 then 
must
p
 
is
weaker than 
must
p
  
Proof Any test T which distinguishes P from Q in the context of p

will also
serve as a test to distinguish P from Q in the context of p Thus if P 
must
p
Q
then P 
must
p
 
Q   
Increasing LN introduces new equivalences in general For example if l
 
and l

are in LR then the processes
P
 
 l
 
  STOP   l

  STOP
P

 l
 
  STOP   l

  STOP u l
 
  STOP
are distinguished by the test T  l

     STOP 
However if l
 
and l

are contained in LN  then there is no test that can
distinguish P
 
from P

 and they are therefore must equivalent


He The next lemma states that increasing HR at the expense of LR preserves
must testing equivalence This scenario is illustrated in Figure 
Lemma   If HN
p
 HN
p
 
 LN
p
 LN
p
 
 and HR
p
 
 HR
p
 then 
must
p
 
is
weaker than 
must
p
  

T will not do since it is not always willing to accept l
 
and l

 
HN
p
HR
p
P
LR
p
LN
p
Figure  Abstracting refusable events
Proof If T is a test which distinguishes P from Q in the context of p

 then
T jjj CHAOS
HR
p
 
nHR
p
will serve as a test to distinguish P from Q in the context
of S  Thus if P 
must
p
Q then P 
must
p
 
Q   
New equivalences can be introduced by this step The two processes l
 
 
STOP and l

  STOP are easily distinguished when l
 
and l

are in LR but
if l
 
and l

are contained in HR then the processes are indistinguishable there
is no activity at the lowlevel interface at all
The 
nal lemma states that increasing HN at the expense of LN preserves
must testing equivalence
Lemma   If HR
p
 HR
p
 
 LR
p
 LR
p
 
 and HN
p
 
 HN
p
 then 
must
p
 
is
weaker than 
must
p
  
Proof If T is a test which distinguishes P from Q in the context of p

 then
T jjj RUN
HR
p
 
x n HR
p
will serve as a test to distinguish P from Q in the
context of p Thus if P 
must
p
Q then P 
must
p
 
Q   
This step also introduces new equivalences The example used with the previous
lemma will also serve here if l
 
and l

are contained in LN then l
 
  STOP
and l

  STOP are easily distinguished but if l
 
and l

become part of H
p
then the processes are indistinguishable with regard to any test
Corollary   If  a   pa   p

a then for any P and Q  if P 
must
p
Q then P 
must
p
 
Q   
If partition p is pointwise less than partition p

 then 
must
p
is stronger than

must
p
 

The relation p   p

de
ned pointwise can also be characterised in terms
of the corresponding sets In this case
p   p

	 LR
p
 LR
p
 
LR
p
 LN
p
 LR
p
 
 LN
p
 
LR
p
 HR
p
 LR
p
 
HR
p
 

highlevel nonrefusable events are hidden from any interacting process and
they are urgent so they behave as hidden events This is made explicit in the
following lemma
Lemma  	 For any process P  P 
must
p
P n HN
p
  
Proof Suppose there is an unsuccessful complete execution of P in parallel
with some test Then P n HN
p
can engage in the same execution interacting
on the same lowlevel events and performing the same highlevel events though
they are now labelled with  actions This execution will also be complete for
P n HN
p
 Conversely suppose there is an unsuccessful complete execution of
P n HN
p
in parallel with a test T  Then P can step through the same execution
and it will be complete for P as well Hence P and P n HN
p
may fail exactly
the same tests so they must pass exactly the same tests  
  Examples
Example  

h
n
  l
r
  STOP 
must
l
r
  STOP
The nonrefusability of the highlevel event means that at the low level the l
n
event is guaranteed to be oered
In contrast a refusable highlevel event yields the following
h
r
  l
r
  STOP 
must
l
r
  STOP
u STOP
At the low level the event l
r
might never be oered since the highlevel event
could be refused in a complete execution In this case the lowlevel behaviour
is described by STOP  However the highlevel event could also be performed
and so the possibility of the lowlevel event is also present  
Example  
h
n 
  l
r 
  STOP
 
h
n
  l
r
  STOP

must
p
l
r 
  STOP
u
l
r
  STOP

must
p
h
n
  l
r 
  STOP
 
h
n 
  l
r
  STOP
In this example the highlevel events are nonrefusable and so one of them is
guaranteed to occur in a complete execution However the testing process has
no control over which will occur and so the process is equivalent to one which
oers a nondeterministic choice between the two lowlevel events An observer
who can engage only in lowlevel events cannot distinguish these three processes
Observe that there is information ow from high to low in the two processes
that have highlevel events the identity of the lowlevel event that occurs allows
the identity of the preceding highlevel event to be deduced  

Example   The refusal of a lowlevel nonrefusable event can still be de
tected by some tests even if the traces are exactly the same For example
l
n
  STOP  
must
STOP u l
n
  STOP
since the test T  l
n
     RUN
l
n
is guaranteed to succeed on the lefthand
process but not on the righthand one
However if some other nonrefusable event is possible then it masks the
distinction
l
n
  STOP 
must
l
n
  STOP u STOP
  l
n
  STOP   l
n
  STOP
There is no LN test that can distinguish these two processes as any such test
must initially oer l
n
alongside l
n
 and so every complete execution must con
tain some lowlevel event
On the other hand if only refusable event are possible alongside l
n
 then the
distinction can still be made
l
n
  STOP  
must
l
n
  STOP u STOP
  l
r
  STOP   l
r
  STOP
The same test T as above will distinguish these processes  
Example    Two processes which are equivalent through lowlevel views
LR and LR individually need not be equivalent through those views together
LR  LR For example de
ne the processes
P
 
 STOP u a   STOP jjj STOP u b   STOP
P

 STOP u a   STOP jjj b   STOP
If p
 
a  lr  p
 
b  hr and p

a  hr  p

b  lr  then
P
 

must p
 
P

P
 

must p

P

The two processes are indistinguishable when only a or only b is available to
be tested
However if both a and b are lowlevel events then there is a test that
distinguishes P
 
from P


T  a   b      STOP   c      STOP n c
It is possible for P
 
to fail this test by performing a but then failing to engage in
b whereas P

cannot do this since if it can perform a then it can also perform
b
In this example the occurrences of a and b in P
 
are completely independent
of each other and the performance of one provides no information about the
performance of the other On the other hand in P

the a and the b are either
both available or both unavailable and so the occurrence of one does provide
information about the availability of the other  

  A note on refusal testing
If the tests had the ability to carry out refusal testing which a timed framework
for example would give them then the distinction between LN
p
and LR
p
is
again signi
cant Refusal testing would be possible only on those events in LR
p

and so moving them to LN
p
would lose some distinctions that could be made
and introduce some new equivalences
The traditional refusal testing example illustrates the point
V   coin   STOP u coee   STOP   tea   STOP
V   coin   STOP u coee   STOP   coin   STOP u tea   STOP
Two vending machines can either return a coin or else provide tea or coee
These are indistinguishable undermust testing However V  can refuse tea and
then provide coee a behaviour that is not possible for V  In our framework
there is no test that can make this distinction
If tea and coee are in LN
p
 then these will be considered equivalent in a
refusal testing framework because the tests will be required to be available on
both of these events and so unable to test them for refusal However if either of
these events is in LR
p
then it could be tested for refusal and thus distinguish the
processes For example if tea is in LR
p
then the test that fails if tea is refused
and coee subsequently performed but succeeds otherwise will distinguish the
two processes
Re	nement
The operational characterisation of must testing equivalence also generalises in
the usual way to must
p
testing re
nement Essentially Q will be a re
nement
of P if any test T that P must succeed must also allow Q to succeed
Definition  
P v
must
p
Q 	 T  TEST
LN
p
 P must
p
T  Q must
p
T
 
In this case if there is any context in which P is guaranteed to behave appropri
ately then Q must also be guaranteed to behave appropriately In the case of
must testing the process description P encapsulates the behaviour that should
be guaranteed in contrast to the world of may testing where P simply describes
what is permitted
 Denotational characterisations
It is useful to have a characterisation in terms of the denotational semantics for
when two processes are must
p
equivalent and when they are may
p
equivalent
This allows modelcheckers such as FDR to be deployed in analysing processes
for such equivalences

 May equivalence
With regard to may testing two processes will be considered equivalent with re
gard to a particular lowlevel view if their trace sets are identical when projected
onto that view
Theorem 
P 
may
p
Q 	 tracesP n H
p
  tracesQ n H
p

 
Proof sketch If there is a test that distinguishes P from Q  then this should
lead to a trace of P n H
p
that is not in Q n H
p
or vice versa And if there is a
trace of one but not the other then this should lead to a test which can make
the distinction  
 Must equivalence
Encapsulating must testing equivalence in the most general case is not straight
forward There are two independent issues to be resolved one concerning the
appropriate way to handle the highlevel events and the other concerning how
best to treat the lowlevel nonrefusable events
Lemma   indicates that nonrefusable highlevel events can simply be
hidden highlevel refusable events should also be removed from view but in a
way which does not make them urgent since they are not required to occur
This can be achieved by running the process in parallel with a process which
might block such highlevel events at any stage and then hiding all the high
level events This is the approach taken in GH by means of a regulator
process
Case  
 LN   
We will begin by considering the set of lowlevel nonrefusable events to be
empty As before highlevel urgent events can simply be hidden
Theorem  If LN    then
P 
must
p
Q 	 FDI P jHR
p
jCHAOS
HR
p
 n H
p

 FDI Q jHR
p
jCHAOS
HR
p
 n H
p

 
The construction P jHR
p
jCHAOS
HR
p
 n H
p
will be abbreviated abs
p
P an
abstracted view of P 
Proof If P  
must
p
Q then there is some test T which distinguishes P from
Q  In this case there is without loss of generality an unsuccessful complete
	
execution e of P in parallel with T  whereas all complete executions of Q in par
allel with T are successful The execution e consists of a sequence of high and
lowlevel transition steps where the lowlevel transitions are in synchronisation
with T and the highlevel steps are independent If the execution contains an
in
nite number of lowlevel events then Q cannot not exhibit the same sequence
of lowlevel events or else Q could take T through the same sequence of unsuc
cessful states Hence there is an in
nite trace of P that is not an in
nite trace
of Q  so their FDI semantics are dierent Otherwise the execution contains
a 
nite number of lowlevel events If it contains an in
nite number of high
level events then it will correspond to a divergence of abs
p
P If abs
p
Q has
the same divergence then it can also take T through an unsuccessful complete
execution the same one or one which diverges earlier which contradicts the
assumption that Q must
p
T  Hence abs
p
Q has a dierent FDI semantics
Finally if the complete unsuccessful execution has a 
nite number of both
highlevel and lowlevel events then it must end in a state where no internal
events of events from HR are possible This corresponds to an execution of
P jHR jCHAOS
HR
which ends in a state where no internal events or internal
events from HR or HN are possible which in turn corresponds to a failure of
abs
p
P since the 
nal state is stable If abs
p
Q exhibits the same failure
then it can engage in a similar complete execution which takes T through the
same states and hence is also unsuccessful But this contradicts the assumption
that Q must
p
T  Hence there is a failure which distinguishes abs
p
P from
abs
p
Q
Hence in all cases if P  
must
p
Q then FDI abs
p
P  FDI abs
p
Q
Conversely suppose that FDI abs
p
P  FDI abs
p
Q Then there is
some behaviour that distinguishes them In this case a test can be constructed
which distinguishes P from Q 
If abs
p
P and abs
p
Q dier on a divergence tr  hl
 
      l
n
i assume without
loss of generality that tr  divergencesP n divergencesQ then the test
T  T
 
will make the distinction where
T
i
 l
i
  T
i 
   c      STOP n c if i  n  
c      STOP n c if i  n  
An execution of a process P in parallel with this test can fail only if there is an
execution of P whose projection onto L is tr  and which is either divergent itself
or else able to perform in
nitely many events from HNprecisely the conditions
for tr to be a divergence of abs
p
P Thus Q must
p
T but P must
p
T 
If abs
p
P and abs
p
Q have identical divergences but dier on an in
nite
trace u  hl
 
 l

      i assume without loss of generality that u  in nitesabs
p
P n
in nitesabs
p
Q then the test T  T
 
using the de
nition above with
n  will make the distinction
Finally abs
p
P and abs
p
Q agree on their divergences and in
nite traces
but dier on some failure tr X  where tr  hl
 
        l
n
i assume without loss
of generality that tr X   failuresabs
p
P n failuresabs
p
Q then the test

T  T
 
as de
ned below will make the distinction
T
i
 l
i
  T
i 
   c      STOP n c if i  n  
x  X      STOP if i  n  
P can fail this test only if there is some execution whose events tr

projected
onto L provides tr  such that after executing tr

none of the events in X HN
are possible But this is possible precisely when tr X   failuresabs
p
P
Hence this test distinguishes P from Q   
This gives us a lowlevel view of a process the lowlevel view of P is simply
abs
p
P This only has lowlevel events Any two processes which exhibit this
lowlevel behaviour are indistinguishable through that view of the process
Case 
 LN   
If the set of lowlevel nonrefusable events is not empty then there are some
constraints on the lowlevel behaviour of the tests
Subcase  
 H   
To begin with we will consider the situation where there are no highlevel events
at all every event is lowlevel some are refusable and some are not
Any  nite complete execution must end up in a state in which all LN events
are impossible for the process This must correspond to a failure tr X  of the
process for which LN  X  The events in LN which were performed should
appear in the trace since they were accessible to the tests This corresponds
to treating the events as urgent but visible which is not as aspect of standard
CSP but which has been analysed in the context of timed CSP DJS The
failures of such a process will be given as the urgent failures with respect to
LN  de
ned as
ufailures
LN
P  ftr X   failuresP j LN  X g
Such a set does not meet the standard axioms for CSP as Example   illus
trates In fact it turns out that it need not meet any of the axioms pertaining
to failures it is not necessarily pre
xclosed on traces subset closed on refusals
or even nonempty and events need not extend either a trace or a refusal set
Example   If H    LN  flng and LR  flrg then
ufailures
LN
lr   ln   STOP  fhi flng hlni flng hlni fln lrgg
This set is neither pre
xclosed on traces subset closed on refusals and on the
behaviour with the empty trace the event nr can extend neither the trace by
itself or the refusal
A recursive process that is always willing to perform events from LN  such
as P  ln   P  has an empty urgent failure set However it is guaranteed to
have in
nite traces corresponding to the sequences of events from LN that it
must be able to perform  

Along with the divergences and in
nite traces the urgent failures set does
characterisemust testing equivalence with regard to nonrefusable lowlevel events
Theorem  If H    then
P 
must
p
Q 	 ufailures
LN
P  ufailures
LN
Q
 divergencesP  divergencesQ
 in nitesP  in nitesQ
 
We will refer to this triple of semantic sets of P with respect to the partition
p as UDI
p
P
Proof If P and Q are dierent under testing then the test that distinguishes
them must expose some dierence in one of these sets An in
nite complete
execution exposes a dierence in the divergences or the failures as in the proof of
Theorem  A 
nite complete execution exposes a dierence in the failures but
a failure in which LN is refused so the ufailures provide sucient information
If P and Q are dierent on one of these sets then there is some test that
can be constructed which distinguishes them by failing only on that particular
behaviour If they dier on divergences or in
nite traces then a test can be
constructed as in the proof of Theorem  If they dier on ufailures then a test
can also be constructed as before introducing at every state an extra choice of
every event in LN to the success state  
A new CSP operator sticky
LN
P can be de
ned which provides a context
for characterising urgent failures FDI  sticky

P  FDI  sticky

Q if and
only P and Q have the same urgent failures divergences and traces As we shall
see this can be de
ned in terms of standard operators enabling modelchecking
within FDR
The sticky operator masks nonurgent failures on a set LN by introducing as
many refusals as possible whenever an event from LN is possible In particular
whenever an event l from LN is possible then it introduces the possibility that
all other events should be refused and that l is the only possible event This
has a similar eect to making the events in LN urgent since it is the process
P itself and not its environment that chooses the event to be performed In
order to be consistent with the axioms of the FDI model such events cannot be
forced to occur since the process might be in an uncooperative environment
but once P has selected an event it will then refuse all other events
It is de
ned denotationally as follows
divergences sticky
LN
P  divergencesP
in nites sticky
LN
P  in nitesP
failures sticky
LN
P  failuresP
 ftr X  j tr
a
l    failuresP
 l  LN  l  X g

Observe that sticky
LN
P has the same traces as P  It is only additional
refusals that are introduced into the failure set
Theorem  given above can be characterised in this form
Theorem  If H    then
P 
must
p
Q 	 sticky
LN
P  sticky
LN
Q
 
Dierent processes might map to the same result under sticky
LN
 For
example P
 
 ln
 
  STOP   ln

  STOP and P

 ln
 
  STOP u ln

 
STOP have dierent refusals yet sticky
LN
P
 
 and sticky
LN
P

 have the
same refusals Hence from Theorem  they are equivalent under must testing
This new operator can also be given an operational semantics which may
provide an alternative understanding of its behaviour The process sticky
LN
P
will have all the transitions that P has together with a few extra ones introduced
to allow events from LN to be selected Two rules de
ne its operational
semantics
P

  P

sticky
LN
P

  sticky
LN
P


P
a
  P

 a  LN 
sticky
LN
P
 
  a   sticky
LN
P


The transitions that are introduced by means of the second rule correspond to
the additional failures that are introduced to sticky
LN
P
If the events in LN are hidden it makes no dierence whether they are
abstracted by means of the sticky operator 
rst
P n LN   sticky
LN
P n LN
Example  Let LN  fl lg The operator sticky
LN
P has the eect
of allowing the process to choose to perform events in LN  or at least to block
further progress until the chosen event is performed Thus an external choice
becomes internal
sticky
LN
l  STOP   l  STOP  l  STOP u l  STOP
A choice between events in LN and other events allows the process to resolve
the choice in favour of the LN events but not against them
sticky
LN
l  STOP   h  STOP  l  STOP
u l  STOP   h  STOP
This is sometimes see Ros written as h  STOP  l  STOP  

The operational semantics for sticky point the way to a de
nition in terms
of the standard CSP operators

 This can be achieved as follows 
rstly let f
old
and g be alphabet renaming functions such that f
old
a  old  a for all a  
and gold  a  gnew  a  a for all a   with g leaving events not of the
form anew or a old unchanged De
ne the process R as follows
R
LN
 old  a  f LN   new  a  R
LN
  old  a  f  n f LN   R
LN
This process allows all events of the form old  a but whenever the event a
is in LN  then it must perform the event new  a before any further events
sticky can then be de
ned as follows
sticky
LN
P  gf P j f  jR n f LN 
Any sticky event a  LN of P is performed internally in this process as old  a
but P is prevented from any further progress by R until new  a occurs which
appears in the overall process as the original sticky event a because of the
renaming g Nonsticky events are performed as expected
Subcase  
 H   
Finally in the most general case we arrive at the following theorem
Theorem 
P 
must
p
Q 	 sticky
LN
abs
p
P  sticky
LN
abs
p
Q
 
Observe that sticky
LN
abs
p
P  abs
p
 sticky
LN
P The order in which
the abstractions are performed is irrelevant
  Congruence
The equivalences considered in this paper are not congruences in general which
is perhaps why they are not generally considered in the literature on testing
This fact is unsurprising since operators can inuence the behaviour of a process
through its abstracted interface and if processes dier there then they may be
aected dierently
Example 
h
r 
  l   STOP 
must
p
h
r
  l   STOP
but
STOP j h
r 
j h
r 
  l   STOP  
must
p
STOP j h
r 
j h
r
  l   STOP

I am grateful to Bill Roscoe for this observation
 
since the processes behave dierently on the abstracted event hr
 
 they can
behave dierently when placed in parallel with a process that interacts with
them on that event
Another example concerns the event renaming where f h
r 
  l
 
 f h
r
 
h
r
 and f l  l  In this case
f h
r 
  l   STOP  
must
p
f h
r
  l   STOP
Finally an event renaming that renames a highlevel refusable event to a
highlevel nonrefusable event but does not map high to low or low to high
f h
r 
  h
n 
 f h
r
  h
r
 and f l  l  In this case
f h
r 
  l   STOP  
must
p
f h
r
  l   STOP
The left hand process cannot refuse l at the low level whereas the right hand
process can
The 
rst two examples also illustrate may equivalences that are not pre
served the last example does preserve may equivalence  
However many of the operators do preserve both equivalences Pre
xing
sequential composition provided X is lowlevel all forms of choice and hiding
certainly do so Parallel composition does so provided all synchronisations are
at the low level thus interleaving preserves equivalence as does the operator
jA j provided A  L Event renaming f P preserves 
must
p
provided the
partitions are respected so pf a  pa for all events a is required for

must
p
 With 
may
p
 we require simply that highlevel events do not become
lowlevel so a  H  f a  H is sucient to guarantee preservation of
equality
 Renement
Both may and must re
nement are characterised in the denotational framework
in the expected way
P v
may
p
Q 	 tracesQ n H
p
  tracesP n H
p

P v
must
p
Q 	 FDI  sticky
LN
abs
p
Q  FDI  sticky
LN
abs
p
P
where  on FDI semantics is de
ned pointwise on each of the three components
failures divergences and in
nite traces
The operational characterisation of re
nement is thus equivalent to the de
notational characterisations
 Noninterference
Noninterference properties are generally considered in the context of a given
system The requirement is that even if an agent knows exactly how the system

works there is no information ow across particular boundaries concerned with
particular activity on that system In other words the options available to the
lowlevel user should not divulge any information about the highlevel users
activity Highlevel users activity is concerned with events in HR the set
HN consists of those highlevel events entirely within the control of the system
Knowing that the system will perform an event of HN does not leak information
about highlevel activity since the highlevel user is unable to prevent it
Information ow from high to low will be prevented if P s lowlevel possi
bilities at any stage are dependent entirely on P s previous lowlevel behaviour
and not in terms of any highlevel behaviour This would seem to indicate that
if two sequences of events have been performed which appear the same on the
low level then the resulting processes should be equivalent
This characterisation can be made in various ways It has traditionally been
made denotationally and this has led to some diculties to its relationship with
re
nement If e is an execution of a process P  then Ltrace
p
e is the sequence
of lowlevel in the sense of the partition p events in e
Operationally lack of information ow in P from high to low level might be
characterised as follows
Definition  A process P is interferencefree with respect to p if
P
e
 
 P

 P
e
  
 P

 Ltrace
p
e

  Ltrace
p
e

 P


must
p
P

 
where Ltrace
p
e is the sequence of lowlevel in the sense of the partition p
events in e If the lowlevel views of two executions are the same then the
resulting processes must be indistinguishable
In this case we can say that P is interferencefree on p This is a very
strong de
nition it excludes nondeterministic processes even those that can
perform no highlevel events such as P  l
r 
  STOP u l
r
  STOP  the
distinguishable processes l
r 
  STOP and l
r
  STOP are both reachable via
the empty trace In fact in such cases a re
nement of this system with respect
to the lowlevel view might introduce highlevel events and lose interference
freedom as a result For example the process Q  h
r 
  l
r 
  STOP   l
r
 
STOP is actually equivalent to P described above with respect to the lowlevel
interface and yet Q leaks information from high to low
This operational de
nition is attractive in one sense since it considers indi
vidually all possible processes resulting from the execution rather than consid
ering them all together where the acceptable behaviour of some can mask the
unacceptable behaviour of others as is the case with the denotational after
operator
This de
nition has the diculty that it is dependent on the precise nature
of the operational semantics for a process and two processes that are equivalent
under must testing for example might be treated dierently by the de
nition
This means that it cannot be characterised denotationally and that in general
its truth or falsity is not determined from the denotational semantics

Divergence
To take an extreme example the process which has one state and is only able to
perform internal actions to that one state may be de
ned recursively as follows
   It is must equivalent to  u LEAK  where LEAK is a process which
takes in messages on a highlevel channel and immediately communicates them
on a lowlevel channel LEAK  in
H
x   out
L
x   LEAK  Yet  meets the
de
nition whereas  u LEAK does not
The desire to have no information ow preserved by re
nement has led to
some diculties with regard to this example If  is seen as a process which
does not provide information ow but it can be re
ned by LEAK  then it is
patently clear that any de
nition of security with respect to information ow is
either going to fail on  or else will not be preserved by re
nement
Divergencefree processes
If the process is divergencefree then the situation is rather better In this case
the de
nition will hold of precisely those processes whose lowlevel behaviour
is deterministic that is those processes P for which abs
p
P is deterministic
This coincides with Roscoes characterisation of noninterference
Theorem  If P is divergencefree then P is interferencefree on p if and
only if abs
p
P is deterministic  
Proof sketch If abs
p
P is deterministic then given any execution P
e
 P


then the process P

reached after the execution must be a re
nement in the
denotational sense of the process P  tracee This means that abs
p
P

 is a re

nement of abs
p
P  tracee which in turn is a re
nement of abs
p
P  Ltrace
p
e
But this process is deterministic since abs
p
P is and so abs
p
P

 must be de
notationally equivalent to abs
p
P  tr since they are both re
nements of the
same deterministic process and hence equivalent to it and thus to each other
This must be the case for any process P

reached after any execution corre
sponding on the low level to tr  and so all such processes are denotationally
equivalent and thus 
must
p
equivalent Hence the de
nition will always apply
to processes whose low level views are deterministic
Conversely if abs
p
P is not deterministic then there is some lowlevel trace
tr such that tr
a
hli is a possible lowlevel trace and tr  flg is a possible
lowlevel refusal set Since P is not divergent these behaviours correspond to
particular executions of P  This means that there are executions e
 
and e

corresponding to tr such that P
e
 
 P
 
l
  and P
e

 P

such that P


 
 
and P


l
   In other words P can reach a state P
 
from which l is possible
and can also reach a stable state P

from which l is not possible Then the test
T  x  LN      STOP   l   RUN
LN
   a      STOP n a
can fail only if l is initially possible Thus P

must
p
T but P
 
must
p
T  Hence
P can reach two states that are distinguishable by some lowlevel test  

Observe that this theorem holds even if LN    despite the fact that tests
cannot directly detect refusals of events in LN  This means that two processes
might be indistinguishable under testing yet the de
nition of noninterference
applies dierently to them For example consider the two processes
P
 
 h
 
  l
n 
  P
 
  h

  l
n
  P
 
P

 h  fh
 
 h

g   l  fl
n 
 l
n
g   P

If LN  fl
n 
 l
n
g then these two processes are indistinguishable at the low
level Any lowlevel test must always be ready to accept all events in LN  and
so is able to make distinctions only on the basis of tracesand P
 
and P

have
the same lowlevel traces
On the other hand it is clear that P
 
allows interference whereas P

does
not and in fact P
 
fails the de
nition given above whereas P

meets it abs
p
P
 

is nondeterministic whereas abs
p
P

 is deterministic
This example also illustrates the point that interferencefreedom is concerned
with particular processes that are given The aim in interferencefreedom is
not to distinguish P
 
from P

 but rather to make deductions about highlevel
activity from the visible lowlevel activity in a given process
 Atomicity and faulttolerance
Atomicity is a feature of particular kinds of speci
cation where the desired
behaviour is characterised in terms of the occurrence or availability of a single
event
Typically in analysing fault tolerance faults are modelled by the occurrence
of special fault events These might appear at certain points of a process
description indicating that the fault can occur at that stage during the process
execution They will then be modelled as refusable eventsthe environment
might perform them when the process makes them available but is not obliged
to do so
The lowlevel activity need not be deterministic so this is dierent from
consideration of information ow properties
For example a oneplace buer that can lose its contents on the occurrence
of a particular fault might be described as follows
FBUFF  inx   out x   FBUFF
  power blip   FBUFF
  power blip   FBUFF
On the other hand fault recovery will generally be modelled as nonrefusable
events the fault recovery mechanism is under the control of the process itself
and should not be blocked by the environment
As a crude example a system might undergo a fault between input and
output from which it must recover before performing output This could be

modelled extremely crudely as
FT  inx   out x   STOP
  fault   recover   out x   STOP
The requirement on the system might be that when the fault recovery mecha
nisms are out of the view of the user then this system should look like a simple
buer taking an input to an output
In other words the requirement on the system is that it is a re
nement under
must
p
testing to
SPEC  inx   out x   STOP
Here we have pfault  hr and precover  hn
Then SPEC v
must
p
FT 
If pfault  hn then any complete execution would not be able to 
nish if
a fault was possiblethis is tantamount to relying on the fault to occur In this
case SPEC 
must
FT again holds but so too does the equivalence
inx   fault   recover   out x   STOP 
must
p
FT
which relies on fault to occur in order to guarantee output
Conversely if precover  hr then recovery can be blocked In this case
correct behaviour cannot be guaranteed and in fact
FT 
must
p
inx   STOP u out x   STOP
The approach to faulttolerant modelling suggested by this example is to
treat fault events as highlevel refusable events HR to treat system recovery
mechanisms as highlevel nonrefusable events HN  and to treat the normal
part of the system which the user interacts with in terms of lowlevel events
either refusable or nonrefusable as appropriate
Bulletproof write
For example a memory cell may be speci
ed by the following process descrip
tion
MEM v  writew   MEM w
 
read v   MEM v
Any user of this cell may either write a fresh value w to it or else read its
current contents v  A protocol which ensures that a write is successful by
means of a sequence of internal events would be required to exhibit the same
behaviour as this speci
cation The speci
cation is concerned with atomicity
in the sense that the internal behaviour should implement a single write event
	
An implementation MEMIMPv would be required to re
ne MEM v when
observed through the interface fwrite readg
MEM v v
must
p
MEMIMPv
In this case all the highlevel events would be internal system events and
would therefore be urgent The lowlevel events on read and write are under
the control of the environment and are therefore in LRthe environment can
refuse them The sets LN and HR are empty Since MEM v is deterministic
any implementation must actually be equivalent to it
In faulttolerant systems the nature and impact of the faults to be tolerated
can have an eect on the speci
cation For example an implementation may be
required to cope with the possibility of power failures on volatile memory Such
a faulttolerant design cannot hope to guarantee success in a write operation
since an update might become lost at the moment it is provided In this case
the requirement will be that the memory cell itself should not be corrupted and
should remain with its previous value
This weaker speci
cation of a faulttolerant memory cell FTMEM is ex
pressed as follows
FTMEM v  writew   FTMEM w u FTMEM v
 
read v   FTMEM v
An implementation of this such as the BulletProofWrite of GH will be
required to satisfy
FTMEM v v
must
p
BPW v
Much of the faulttolerance will not be expressed directly as a CSP speci
cation
but will rather be contained within the modelling of the system components
which comprise the system BPW  The faults that are possible will be modelled
explicitly as events which are possible for their components and their impact
will also be contained within the component description The set of all fault
events can be given as the set FAULTS  All such fault events will be considered
as highlevel refusable events and so FAULTS  HR
A memory cell implementation will be faulttolerant in a particular sense if
it can always recover from corruption in the presence of fault events which can
cause corruption On the other hand it will not be faulttolerant to the extent
that it will sometimes fail to do the update Faulttolerance is generally with
respect to particular faults and coping with the most serious faults might result
in a degraded service
A liveness or correctness expectation would be that the memory should be
updated when no fault events occur
MEM v v
must
p
STOP jFAULTS jBPW v
This will prevent a trivial implementation whereby no update is ever carried
out

Database transaction
We may wish to think of obtaining an answer from a database as an atomic
transaction But if we put in a request for an answer and the database has to
do some recovery 
rst eg if it becomes clear that there is some corruption
of data then this should be invisible to the user and contained as part of the
atomic transaction of receiving an answer
Here the speci
cation would be SPEC  queryx   answer f x   SPEC 
and the requirement on any implementation IMP is that SPEC v
must
p
IMP 
In order to make this speci
cation precise it must be decided where each event
appears in the interface In this case the query is under the control of the
environment and hence will appear in LR the answer can be under the control
of the system and hence appear in LN  and all other events appear in H  with
the fault events appearing in HR
The user does not want or need to see all the internal activity so from his
point of view the system does behave in an atomic way From the point of view
of the tests that the user can attempt the operation answer is atomic
 Summary
This paper has been concerned with providing a more explicit approach to the
kind of abstraction that is achieved when processes are viewed through partic
ular interfaces and where their events can be considered as refusable or not
refusable by the environment of the process The results have reinforced the
denotational approach provided a more explicit explanation and justi
cation
and indeed have extended that approach by considering a more general cate
gorisation of events
This form of abstraction has been analysed for both may and must testing
with respect to a partition p of the interface of the process and the variation in
the relations as the partition p varies has also been analysed as less control over
events is provided to the testing environment either through removal from the
interface or through nonrefusability the equivalence relations become weaker
Themay testing equivalence and re
nement relations turn out to be relatively
straightforward to characterise in denotational terms and are indeed equivalent
to the denotational approaches which have been traditionally taken
Must testing equivalence and re
nement have also resulted in the expected
equivalences as far as highlevel and refusable lowlevel events are concerned
but the relations when lowlevel nonrefusable events are permitted have not
been previously considered and were tricky to characterise At present it is
still an open question whether the equivalence relation in this case can be char
acterised using the existing CSP language or whether an extension would be
required
This approach to abstraction has been used in what appears to be an ex
tremely strong operational characterisation of noninterference or interference
freedom which turns out to be equivalent to Roscoes RWW characterisation
 
on nondivergent processes We have also considered its place in the speci
ca
tion of faulttolerant systems and in the characterisation of speci
cations that
make use of atomicity
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